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THE MARITAL DEDUCTION AND EQUALIZATION
UNDER THE FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT
TAXES BETWEEN COMMON LAW AND
COMMUNITY PROPERTY STATES

Paul E. Anderson*
N 1948, as the culmination of much dissatisfaction with the
treatment of community property under the federal estate and
gift tax laws, Congress adopted a new formula for the treatment of
gifts and bequests between spouses; this formula was known as the
marital deduction. It has remained practically unchanged since
its adoption and still stands as an integral part of our federal estate
and gift tax structure.
The basic purpose of the deduction was to provide equalization
in estate and gift tax treatment between spouses residing in community property states and those residing in common law property
states. The plan of this article is to analyze the marital deduction
against the experience of eight years to determine whether or not
it has lived up to this basic purpose.

I

I.
A.

THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX

Equalization Under the Adjusted Gross Estate Limitation

I. Statutory Framework: A Contrast Between the Marital
Deduction and Community Property. Under the pattern of the
federal estate tax, the marital deduction is computed upon the
estate of the decedent; it includes no part whatever of the potential
estate of the surviving spouse. Thus, we cannot have a true splitting of the total family estate under the marital deduction; if any
splitting is accomplished, it is a bisection of the first decedent's
estate only.
But under the civil law, the total community property estate
is split between the spouses. Each spouse dies owning one-half of
the total estate. Obviously, there's a difference here. In a moment
we shall explore it, but first let us examine the statutory mechanics
that create this potential inequity.
• A.B. 1948, J.D. 1950, University of Michigan; member, California bar; formerly
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue; partner in Kent
and Brookes, San Francisco; author of various articles on taxation.-Ed.
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Section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code,1 which provides
for the estate tax marital deduction, is built up of two parts: one
consists of the clauses, provisos, and subparagraphs relating to the
type of transfer that qualifies for the deduction; the other limits
the dollar amount of the deduction, regardless of the nature of the
transfers made in the estate. It is the latter that causes the above
inequity. Subsection (c) of section 2056 establishes this "limitation on aggregate of deductions" by prohibiting ·any deduction in
excess of "50 percent of the value of th.e adjusted gross estate. . . ."
The "adjusted gross estate," as defined in subsection 2056 (c) (2),
is a function of the decedent's gross estate; in over-simplified fashion, we might say that it is the gross estate of the decedent, as figured
for estate tax purpose, less expenses of administration, claims and
indebtedness of the estate, and losses incurred in administration. 2
In other words, the maximum deduction allowable is one-half the
decedent's gross esta"te less claims, etc., otherwise deductible.
But community property is divided on a different principle.
Each spouse is entitled to one-half of the community estate,3 and
consequently only his one-half of the total estate is taxable to the
estate of the spouse first to die. 4 And if the estate consists solely
of community property, no marital deduction is allowable.5
2. If the Husband D_ies First. An example will make this
difference in treatment clear. Let us assume a husband and wife
1 I.R.C., §2056, as adopted by Public Law 591, c. 736, 83d Cong., 2d sess. (1954);
26 U.S.C. (Supp. II, 1955) §2056. Unless otherwise specified, all section references contained herein are made to the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.
2 For a clearer picture, see I.R.C., §§2053, 2054. And note also the "Special Rule in
Cases Involving Community Property" found in subparagraphs (B) and (C) of §2056 (c).
3 For example, note Cal. Civ. Code (West, 1954) §16la, which states: "The respective
interests of the husband and wife in community property during continuance of the
marriage relation are present, existing and equal interests. . • ."
4Arizona: Greenwood v. Commissioner, (9th Cir. 1943) 134 F. (2d) 915 (dicta); T.D.
3138, 4 Cum. Bui. 238 (1921). California: United States v. Goodyear, (9th Cir. 1938) 99 F.
(2d) 523. Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada and New Mexico: T.D. 3138, 4 Cum. Bui. 238 (1921).
Texas: G.C.M. 7773, IX-2 Cum. Bui. 426 (1930). Washington: Lang v. Commissioner,
304 U.S. 264, 58 S.Ct. 880 (1938).
5 The mechanics for eliminating community property are found in I.R.C., §2056 (c) (2) (B)
and (C). The technique used by the code is to require that the decedent's adjusted
gross estate (which, as we saw, limits the allowable deduction) be reduced, dollar
for dollar, for each piece of community property included in the gross estate, provided
the inclusion was only at one-half the value. Thus, if all the estate were one-half interests
in community property, the adjusted gross estate would be reduced by an amount equal to
itself, and no marital deduction would be permitted. But if the estate includes separate
property of the decedent as well as his interests in the community estate, his estate will be
entitled to a deduction equal to one-half the separate property less the claims, expenses,
etc., not attributable to the community property. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47d (b).
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living in a community property state owning a community estate
of $400,000, after deduction for claims, expenses, etc. How does
their tax burden compare with that imposed upon a similar couple
residing in a common law state? Suppose this second couple also
owns $400,000 held in joint tenancy, of which the wife has contributed $100,000. 6 In both cases let us assume the husband, H,
dies first.

Common Law

Community Property

H's estate
$300,000
Less marital deduction 150,000

$200,000

Less specific exemption

$150,000
60,000

$200,000
60,000

H's taxable estate

$ 90,000

$140,000

-0-

The common law states appear to have the better of it. In terms
of approximate tax, H's estate would owe a tax of $17,900 under
common law concepts as compared to a $32,700 tax under community property rules. And this advantage in initial savings is
inevitably present in all cases in which the spouses each own
property in a common law state. For instance, if the above example
were reversed, and the wife, W, died first, the discrepancy would
be even more striking. If H survived her, her taxable estate would
be zero ($100,000-$50,000 marital deduction and $60,000 exemption) in the common law case but $140,000 ($200,000-$60,000
exemption) in the community property situation.
This comparative advantage in initial saving of tax is equal to
the tax upon one-half the estate of the surviving spouse as if that
one-half were added to the first estate. Thus, the tax on H's community property estate exceeds the tax upon H's common law tax. able estate by the marginal increase in tax if one-half of W's estate
were added to H's estate. Or, in terms of a formula, we have:
6 In any case in which the surviving spouse has no property of his own, the tax
computations are identical in both cases. Thus, if in the above example, H were to own
the entire $400,000 and all of it were to be included in his gross estate on his death, his
estate would be entitled to a marital deduction .of $200,000 as well as the $60,000 specific
exemption, leaving a taxable estate of $140,000 (the same as our community property
husband).
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H's community property estate= H's taxable estate at
common law+ ½ (W's estate)
Thus, in the above example, we may substitute the figures:
($200,000-$60,000)
or $140,000

= ($150,000-$60,000) + ½ ($100,000),
= $90,00d + $50,000

What practical difference does this make? We see a large discrepancy in initial tax, but we also realize that most of this tax
advantage will be equalized when the surviving spouse dies. Take,
as an illustration, our first example. Assume the wife, W, dies
soon after H's death, and she includes in her estate her own property plus any additions she may have received as a result of H's
marital deduction transfers. 7

Common Law

W's original estate
Plus transfers from H

W's estate
Less specific exemption

W's taxable estate

Community Property

$100,000

$200,000

150,000

-0-

$250,000

$200,000

60,000

60,000

$190,000

$140,000

Here the tax picture is reversed. In a community property
state, W's estate incurs a $32,700 tax as compared to $47,700 under
common law rules. Thus the initial common law advantage is
effectively wiped out. The overall tax burden becomes slightly
greater for the spouses in the common law state ($65,600 versus
$65,400) because of the progressive rates of taxation imposed upon
estates. Being faced with a progressive rate of taxation, we find
7 Note that as a general rule it is not sound tax planning to bequeath property in
excess of the deductible amount to the su~ving spouse. This generalization rests upon
the maxim that one should design his estate plans as to incur no more than one estate
tax per generation. Thus, if H leaves non-deductible property to W, that non-deductible
property will be taxed both in H's estate and in W's estate before passing to their de•
scendants. It is true that under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, transfers of -property
between spouses may qualify for the credit for tax on prior transfers (§2013), but this
credit seldom equals the additional tax burden. Furthermore, this credit is a disappearing
thing reducing from 100% within two years after the first decedent's death to zero if more
than ten years elapse before the second spouse dies.
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that it is generally cheaper taxwise to divide the total family estate
into two equal units than to use any other division (as in our first
example of one to three). 8
What practical effect does this difference in treatment have?
Is it a matter of any serious concern? The answer depends upon
the importance to the family estate plan of the initial saving in tax.
Suppose, for instance, we are comparing two one-million dollar
estates-one in California, the other in Michigan. And let us
assume that in each case the estate is owned equally between the
spouses. If the California property is community property, we
have the following difference in tax result:

Community Property

Common Law

H's gross estate

$500,000

$500,000

Less marital deduction 250,000

-0-

$250,000

$500,000

60,000

60,000

H's taxable estate

$190,000

$440,000

H's approximate tax

$ 47,700

$126,500

Less exemption

The inequality between the two property systems amounts to
$78,800 in taxes; in effect only one-quarter of the family estate is
taxed on H's death in Michigan, whereas one-half is taxed on H's
s This suggests another formula for estate planning, which may or may not be useful.
From a pure tax standpoint, we should design our marital transfers so that the wife's

potential estate will be equalized with the husband's. To accomplish this result, we may
use the following formula as a guide:
Marital deduction = (H's estate
W's estate) - W's estate
2
or
Marital deduction = ($300,000
$100,000) - $100,000
2
Marital deduction = $100,000
This is considerably less than the maximum marital deduction available to H's estate
($150,000), but a marital transfer of $100,000 from H to W does equalize the two estates
at $200,000 apiece, thus accomplishing our objective. But beware of these nice mathematics: not only are they impossible of achievement in practice, but also they impose an
almost insuperable drafting and administering problem upon those who must carry out
the testator's mathematical desires. There are usually other, and perhaps even less expensive, methods of accomplishing the same result. Perhaps W may dissipate part of her
excessive assets by high living or by inter vivos gifts.

+

+
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death in California.9 Both percentage-wise and money-wise, this
difference in initial tax is substantial: in this example, the California spouses pay almost three times the taxes paid by the Michigan spouses at H's death.
·
Not until the death of Ware the two situations equalized; at
that time, unless W has spent or given away the property, W's
estate in Michigan will consist of three-quarters of the total but in
California only one-half. Thus the effect of the inequality in
treatment is merely to postpone the collection of the tax for the
period of W's remaining life. This postponement of the tax has
several important advantages to the couple in the common law state.
During her life the surviving spouse has the use of the amount of
taxes so postponed and may invest it for her own benefit. If the
surviving spouse is comparatively young, the life income earned
on this saving may be substantial.
Furthermore, the wife is given this additional period of time in
which to eliminate, if possible, a major share of the postponed tax.
To the extent that her estate is depleted, whether by spending,
losses, casualties, poor management, etc., the postponed estate tax
will never be paid. She can also dispose of a good portion of her
estate at gift tax rates and again eliminate the postponed estate tax.
Thus the theoretical disadvantage of splitting family estates into
two unequal shares may never be actually suffered.
As to their community property interests, the California spouses
have no such option. Because community property must be eliminated from the adjusted gross estate ceiling, one-half of the family
estate is taxed at H's death without opportunity for realizing the
initial saving of tax on the additional one-quarter.
To sum up then, we find that a substantial inequality in treatment exists under the present marital deduction formula when the
husband dies first. At common law, an initial saving in the tax
may be realized that is not available to community property spouses.
Theoretically this initial advantage will be wiped out on the wife's
death, but there is no certainty of its occurring. And, in the interim, the wife in a common law state has the use and enjoyment of
the saving in tax money not available to her community property
sister.
9 Compare the statement of John W. Snyder, Secretary of the Treasury, on March 11,
1948, to the Senate Finance Committee, Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1948, 80th Cong.,
2d sess., p. 20 at 26 (1948).
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3. If the Wife Dies First. The community property states are
the ones enjoying an advantage if the wife dies first. Again we are
assuming that the wife in the common law jurisdiction is the poorer
spouse. In the community property states, she is treated as being
a co-equal owner with her husband of their community property.
In our first example of the $400,000 estates, owned $300,000 to
Hand $100,000 to Win the common law state, we find the following situation:

Community Property

Common Law
W's estate

$100,000

$200,000

50,000

-0-

$ 50,000

$200,000

60,000

60,000

-0-

$140,000

Less marital deduction

Less specific exemption

W's taxable estate

Under this example, at W's death, no estate tax at all is paid in a
common law state as contrasted to a $32,700 tax for the civil law
spouses. Again it appears as if it is better for a couple to reside
in a common law state. But this saving, phenomenal as it may be,
is only the initial saving; its price is high.
On H's subsequent death, we must add to his estate the transfers
received from W. Therefore, on H's death, the picture is the
following:

Common Law
H's estate
Add transfers from W
Total H's estate
Less specific exemption

H's taxable estate

Community Property

$300,000

$200,000

50,000

-0-

$350,000

$200,000

60,000

60,000

$290,000

$140,000

Now the tax burden is reversed. H at common law pays a tax of
$78,500 against the civil law tax of $32,700. The overall tax
burden on both estates is $13,100 greater for the spouses residing
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in a common law state than that resulting to the community property couple ($78,500-$65,400). The reason is obvious. Every
dollar deducted by W as part of a marital transfer to H is added
to H's already larger estate, swelling its size even more. In other
words, property is deducted from W's low bracket estate to be
transferred to H where it is taxed at the highest rates applicable to
his estate.
Thus the value of the initial saving in this case is completely
wiped out.10 In order to salvage any part of the extra tax to be due
on his death, H would have to take steps during his lifetime to dispose of the property (for insta!}ce, by gifts or consumption), or he
would have to remarry to qualify someone else as his surviving
spouse so that a marital dedµction would be allowable in his estate.
All the advantage lies with the community property states in
this situation where the poorer spouse dies first. The couple in
the common law state has lost the chance to split the larger estate
between themselves for estate tax purposes. If the poorer spouse
dies without any property, their entire estate will be taxed in one
estate with no opportunity for equalizing the tax with that levied
on their community property counterparts.
In larger estates, this tax disadvantage becomes almost catastrophic. Consider the difference in tax on a $2,000,000 estate,
first, if split between the spouses and, second, if taxed all to the
husband. In the first case, the tax is approximately $753,200, but
in the second only $651,400 (2 x $325,700), the difference being
$101,800, or about 5 percent of the total family estate. But isn't
this merely a chimerical inequality? Can't the spouses in a common law state equalize their holdings by gifts between themselves
and thereby avoid the tax catastrophe resulting from the death of
the poorer spouse first?
4. Gifts from Husband to Wife. What is the relative tax
picture if the richer spouse attempts to plan against the catastrophe
outlined in the prior section by gifts to the poorer spouse? Can the
10 These examples illustrate another general rule of tax planning of the marital
deduction. Never create deductible transfers in the estate of the poorer spouse unless you
have first designed .an acceptable means of getting rid of the property from the richer
spouse's estate prior to his death. In this situation, the old, familiar life estate to the
richer spouse, remainder to children would be the most advantageous transfer to be considered for the poorer spouse's estate. Although such a transfer would not qualify for the
marital deduction, being a prohibited terminable interest under I.R.C., §2056 (b), it
would not later be includible in the richer spouse's gross estate. I.R.C., §2033.
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estates of the two be equalized prior to the death of either in order
to avoid the loss of the marital deduction? The answer must be
that although such gifts are possible, they are not very economical.
An example will show the reason why: Take a $1,000,000 estate
owned all by H in a common law state, but as community property
in the other case. Suppose H in the common law state tries to
equalize W's holdings by giving her $500,000 before his death.

Community Property

Common Law
H's original estate
Gifts to W

H's estate
Gift tax on transfers11

H's estate at death

$1,000,000

$500,000

500,000

-0-

$ 500,000

$500,000

42,525

-0-

$ 457,475

$500,000

Now the estates are equalized; regardless of who dies first, the
maximum gross estate will be $500,000, just as in the community
property state. But the price paid for this prior-to-death equalization is a gift tax of $42,525, a more than minor inequality between
the two property systems, because no gift tax liability at all is incurred in the automatic division of interests in community
property.
If, after this planning, the richer spouse dies first, the entire
amount of gift tax paid is wasted. In the above example, H could
have transferred the entire $500,000 to W tax-free at his death; by
his prior act of making gifts he incurred a needless gift tax liability.
On the other hand, H can still place himself in a better position
than his community property twin by transferring one-half of his
remaining estate to W and thus paying an estate tax on only onequarter of his total estate:
11 Computed as follows, taking account of the gift tax marital deduction (I.R.C.,
§§2502, 2523):
Gross gifts
$500,000
Less marital deduction (½)
$250,000
specific exemption
30,000 280,000

Taxable gifts
Gift tax on $220,000

$220,000
$ 42,525
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Community Property

H's estate
$457,475
Less marital deduction 228,737

$500,000
-0-

$228,738
Less specific exemption 60,000

$500,000
60,000

H's taxable estate
Estate tax
Gift tax

$168,738
$ 41,318
$ 42,525

$440,000
$123,500
-0-

Total tax

$ 83,843

$123,500

This, of course, is another manifestation of the inequality in the
marital deduction formula pointed out in the first section of this
article. And this advantage is only in the initial saving in tax;
the overall tax picture will drastically change this advantage, because the one-quarter deduction from H's estate will be added to
the top of W's estate. Three-quarters of their entire estate will be
pyramided in her taxable estate. Thus, there is little to be gained
in the search for equalization from the device of gifts to the poorer
spouse.
And even if the poorer spouse dies first, still no real tax equalization is achieved. Perhaps we have mitigated the tax catastrophe
outlined in the prior section, but we have done little beyond that.
Assuming that W dies first, leaving no property to H to prevent a
pyramiding effect in his estate, we find that the transfers to the
second generation beneficiaries are still more expensive for the
couple in the common law state:

Common Law

Community Property

W's estate
H's estate
H's gifts to w
W's estate tax
H's estate tax
H's gift tax

$500,000
457,475
500,000
123,500
112,892
42,525

$500,000
500,000

Total tax burden

$278,917

$247,000

123,500
123,500
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5. Gifts to Others. Let us return again to our million dollar
example. Suppose again the million dollar estate is owned all by
H in a common law state as contrasted to community property
ownership. As we saw, it does not make tax sense for our common
law H to attempt to equalize his wife's holdings by giving her
$500,000. · But what of the utility of giving the same $500,000
directly to their children?12
Common Law
H's estate
Gifts to children

Community Property

$1,000,000

$500,000

500,000

-0-

$ 500,000
Gift tax on transfer13

H's estate at death

85,050
$ 414,950

$500,000

Thus we have transferred half of H's common law property out of
his estate. Consequently his estate will be taxed as if he had taken
advantage of the marital deduction whether or not W survives him.
Thus the tax catastrophe that might result from W's prior death,
coupled with the loss of the deduction, has been cured by this
expedient.
But at what price? H has had to pay a federal gift tax of $85,050
for the privilege of splitting his estate at common law. Is this tax
payment wasted if H dies first, as it is in the case of taxable gifts
directly to W? The answer is, no. By paying the $85,050 gift
tax, H has effectively transferred the $500,000 beyond the effective
reach of the estate tax levied not only on his own estate but also
on W's. The upshot is that he has transferred half of his estate at
12 If necessary, the gift can be from H to W for life, remainder to children. For purposes of the gift tax, no marital deduction would be allowable against the value of the life
estate to W, but the value of the remainder could properly be split between H and W as
a joint gift. I.R.C., §2513. See Part III, C infra.
13 Computed as follows, taking advantage of the split gifts provision (I.R.C., §2513):
Gross gifts
$500,000
Less W's share of gifts (½)
$250,000
specific exemption
30,000 280,000

Taxable gifts
Gift tax on $220,000
2 x tax (for tax on W's share)

$220,000
$ 42,525
$ 84,050
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gift tax rates, which up to a certain point14 is cheaper than a transfer at estate tax rates. If we compare the community property vs.
common law situation, this conclusion is made clear:

Common Law

Community Property

H's estate at death
Less exemption

$414,950
60,000

$500,000
60,000

H's taxable estate
H's estate tax
W's estate at death
Less exemption

$354,950
$ 99,284

$440,000
$126,500
$500,000
60,000

W's taxable estate
W's estate tax
Gift tax on H's transfers
Total tax liability

$440,000
$126,500
85,01;>0
$184,334

$253,000

This surprising turn of events does not mean that the common law
spouses have an advantage; all it means is that the community property married couple should get busy and make similar inter vivos
gifts to realize the same saving in tax.
The only true inequality remaining in this situation is the difference in settlements available under the two property systems;
in the community property case, the spouses achieve the splitting
of their estate during their lifetime without ( 1) incurring a lifetime
transfer tax, or (2) giving up their control and management of
their property. In the case of a couple at common law, both disabilities must be incurred in order to prevent the complete loss
of the opportunity to split their estate. As planners in common
law states well know, this is a high price to pay; no one is more
reluctant to relinquish control over property than he who earned it.
6. Conclusion. The basic statutory framework of the marital
deduction in itself works substantial inequity between the two
property systems. Community property division is effected upon
14 Generally, gift tax rates are only 75% of the estate tax rates levied upon the same
brackets.
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the total community estate; the marital deduction split is available
only as to the common law estate of the first spouse to die. The
result is a series of inequalities:
(1) If the spouses have approximately equal estates, only
one-fourth of the combined estates need be taxed under the common law system as against one-half in the civil law states on the first
death.
(2) If one spouse himself owns practically all of the couple's
property and he dies first, the result at common law is practical
equalization with community property splitting; one-half of the
combined estates is taxed in either case. This situation appears
to be the one for which the marital deduction formula was designed.
(3) Again, if at common law one spouse has all the property
but he survives his spouse, there will be no tax on the prior death
of his spouse. But on his death, all of the estate will be taxed in
his estate. If, by way of contrast, all the property were community
property, one-half would be taxed in each estate. ·
Only in the "classic case," that is, where the husband owns all
the property at common law and he dies first, is equalization
achieved; in the other situations postulated, substantial inequality
exists between the two property systems. To what extent is the
"classic case" the typical one in common law states? Certainly it
is not the invariable one. Despite insurance company and trust
department statistics, in some cases wives do die before their husbands. Nor is it inconceivable that some of their property may be
the wives' own. And it is here where the inequalities arise.

B.

The Terminable Interest Rule as an Equalizing Device

I. Introductory. At the time the 1948 amendments to the
federal estate tax were proposed, serious concern was expressed
over the possibility that estate planners in common law states would
use the marital deduction to pass property to the decedents' beneficiaries without paying any estate tax at all. The typical situation
that caused them concern was this one:

H to W for life, remainder to C.
If the value of the life estate to W were not taxable in H's estate
on H's death, it never would be taxable: under traditional estate
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tax rules, no part of the property is taxed in W's estate on her death,

despite her life estate.15
Because of this possibility, the "terminable interest rule" was
inserted into the marital deduction provisions. Basically, the rule
disqualifies from the measure of the deduction any interest passing
to the surviving spouse which will terminate or fail
". ~ . on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or
contingency, or on the failure of an event or contingency to
occur . . . [ and] an interest in such property passes or has
passed (for less than an adequate and full consideration in
money or money's worth) from the decedent to any person
other than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse).
"16

Because, in the above transfer, W's life estate in the property is
one that will terminate on her death and will be succeeded by the
remainder interest in C on her death, the value of her life estate
does not qualify for the deduction.17
If we attempt to break down the marital deduction rule into
its component factors, we find that the following conditions must be
present before the rule applies to deny the deduction:
(1) The surviving spouse's interest must have been carved out
of the decedent's interest; if it is co-equal to the decedent's interest,
the terminable interest rule does not apply.
(2) The partial interest given to the surviving spouse must
be less in point of time than the decedent's interest; if it is co-equal
to the decedent's interest timewise, the terminable interest rule
does not apply.
(3) The surviving spouse's partial interest in point of time
must be succeeded by the interest of the other beneficiary who
shares in the decedent's interest; if the other taker's interest precedes or is contemporaneous with the surviving spouse's interest,
the terminable interest rule does not apply.
(4) The succeeding partial interest in point of time taken by
the other beneficiary must have been created by the decedent out
15 I.R.C., §2033; Treas. Reg. 105, §81.13; Hugh D. Rhodes, 41 B.T.A. 62 at 73 (1940),
nonacq. (as to another issue) 1940-1 Cum. Bul. 8, affd. (8th Cir. 1941) 117 F. (2d) 509;
Mary Clare Milner, 6 T.C. 874 a·t 881 (1946), acq. 1946-2 Cum. Bul. 4; Williams v. United
States, (Ct. Cl. 1930) 41 F. (2d) 895 at 897; Davis v. United States, (D.C. N.Y. 1939)
27 F. Supp. 698 at 700. See Helvering v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 at 59,
62 S. Ct. 925 (1942).
161.R.C., §2056 (b)(l).
17 Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47b (d), example (i).
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of his interest for less than a full and adequate consideration; if
the succeeding taker paid for his interest, the terminable interest
rule does not apply.18

2. Effect on the "Life Estate to Wife, Remainder Over" Settlement. The terminable interest rule was designed to disqualify
the "life estate to wife, remainder to others" type of transfer. Consequently, we find that in common law states the use of this type
of transfer has been abandone~ in any case in which the estate
planner's objective is the creation of a marital deduction bequest.
Little concern was expressed in Congress at the time the terminable interest rule was adopted. Any furor raised by lawyers in
common law states in opposition to the virtual scrapping of a
valuable time-tested estate settlement was overruled by the nonchalant answer that it was necessary as "a matter of equalization."
Why a matter of equalization? Because, the argument ran, a husband cannot control the disposition of his wife's one-half community property interest. He cannot leave her with only a life
estate in her one-half, because she already owns a fee interest in
that one-half. In order, therefore, to equalize qualitatively the
modes of property settlement between the two systems of property
ownership, we must exclude from the marital deduction any type
of common law settlement that gives the surviving spouse any
interest less than an absolute one in the property transferred.19
But was this assumption true? Has· the disqualification of the
life estate to the surviving spouse created substantial equality between the two property systems? The record speaks for itself.
Normally, it is true that a decedent has no interest in or control
over his surviving spouse's community property. However, in the
18 Perhaps it would not be too wrong to say that we have created a modem-day
"law of shifting uses" to plague ourselves just as medieval lawyers prior to 1536 had to
contend with the true "shifting use." In any event, the author has found it of value to
apply the concept of a "shifting use" to interests created under an estate tax transfer to
assist him in applying the terminable interest rule. As you will recall, a "shifting use" was
"(a) use which is so limited that it will be made to shift or transfer itself, from one
beneficiary to another, upon the occurrence of a certain event after its creation. For example, an estate is limited to the use of A and his heirs, provided that, upon the return
of B from Rome, it shall be to the use of C and his heirs; this is a shifting use, which
transfers itself to C when the event happens." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 4th ed., 1711
(1951).
19 S. Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bnl. 285 at 305. Sugarman, "Estate
and Gift Tax Equalization-The Marital Deduction," 36 CALIF. L. REv. 223 at 236 (1948);
Surrey, "Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948," 61 HARv. L. REv.
1097 at 1127 (1948). In addition, estate planners in common law jurisdictions were probably not too concerned about exchanging the life estate-remainder settlement for the opportunity of obtaining a plan for splitting estates between spouses for tax purposes.
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case of the husband dying first, the surviving. widow may be put
to an election under his will; if she wants to take under his will
she must consent that her one-half share of the community property
be disposed of under the terms of the decedent's will as if it had
been the property of the decedent. Her other choice is i:o renounce
the will and content herself with her vested one-half interest.20
The customary use of this so-called "widow's election" is to
create in the surviving widow a life estate in the whole community
in exchange for her yielding up the remainder interest in her onehalf. The arrangement for this exchange of interests may be made
either prior to or after death, but regardless of the mechanics, the
widow's consent is normally treated as revocable until her husband's death.
In order to be specific, let us consider an actual case. In Pacific
National Bank of Seattle, Executor,21 the issue arose whether the
whole or merely the decedent's one-half of the community estate
should be included in his gross estate under one of these widow's
elections. The decedent was the husband. Prior to his death he
had executed a will that disposed of the entire community estate
by pouring it into an inter vivos trust previously established by
him; basically, the trust provided a lifetime income for his wife
with the corpus to be paid to his son after her death. Attached to
the will and incorporated by reference in it was a consent form in
which his wife agreed that her half of the community property
should pass into the trust and that she would take only those interests in the property that were established by her husband's will.
Because the will disposed of the entire community, the Commissioner attempted to include the entire community in the
decedent's gross estate. In this attempt he failed. The Board
held that the property retained its character as community property
despite the execution of the consent; hence only his own half
could properly be taxed in the decedent's estate.22
Here all of the property is transferred in husband's estate, yielding only a life estate in the wife with remainder over. Yet an estate
tax is paid only on one-half to the community. What we have done
is to recognize the creation of a terminable interest in the surviving
20 According to de Funiak [PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §217 (1943)], the
election is available principally in California and Texas. Apparently it is also found in
Washington. Falknor, "Liability <;>f the Entire Community Estate for the Payment of State
Inheritance Tax Where Husband Undertakes to Dispose of Entire Community Estate
by Will and Wife Elects to Take Under the Will," 5 WASH. L. REv. 55 (1930).
2140 B.T.A. 128 (1939), acq. 1939-2 Cum. Bul. 25 at 28.
22 Accord: Coffman-Dobson Bank &: Trust Co., Executors, 20 B.T.A. 890 (1930),- acq.
X-1 Cum. Bul. 13 (1931).
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spouse without forfeiting the estate tax advantage of splitting the
community estate between the spouses. The fact that the surviving
widow's interest terminates on her death does not affect the community property separation of the two estates on her husband's
death.
But, in fairness to community property states, two distinctions
between this type of widow's election and the common law life
estate-remainder over settlement must be recognized. First, in
the widow's election situation, the wife must affirmatively consent
to the transfer; in common law jurisdictions her statutory rights
in taking against the will must normally be asserted by her and
are usually considerably less in scope than an outright fee interest
in one-half the estate. Second, the wife will be treated as having
made a gift of her remainder interest at the time of her husband's
death when her consent becomes final. Not only will she incur a
gift tax at the time of his death, 23 but also it is probable that the
entire value of her one-half of the property remaining in existence
at the time of her death will be taxed in her estate as a transfer
subject to a retained life estate.24
This result shows us forcibly that neither the fisc nor the common law states are put at a disadvantage revenue-wise because of the
use of the widow's election in community property states. One
reason for outlawing the life estate-remainder over settlement was
to prevent the escape of property from estate taxation. Where
the widow had no interest in the property in which she acquires a
life interest on her husband's death, there is no taxable event that
would place any portion of the property in her estate on her death.
Consequently, a deduction in her husband's estate would permit
the property deducted to escape the levy of the tax collector.
But where the life estate is drawn out of the widow's own property, as in the case·of the widow's election, her death does create
23 Chase National Bank, 25 T.C. No. 74 (1955). The amount of the gift made by the
wife at the time of her husband's death is the subject of intense controversy at the present
time. Is it the value of her one-half community estate less the value of her life estate
therein, i.e., the remainder interest in her estate? Or is it the value of her remainder
reduced by the consideration she receives for making her transfer, i.e., by the value of
her life estate in her husband's one-half? In the Chase National Bank case, the Tax Court
sustained the taxpayer, holding that the value of her gift is her remainder less her life
estate in the decedent husband's estate. Accord, Mildred Irene Siegel, 26 T.C. No. 91 (1956).
24 I.R.C., §2036. It has been suggested with some force that the measure of the estate
tax on her death must be reduced proportionately to reflect the consideration received
by the decedent wife at the time she made her gift, i.e., the estate tax may be levied only
on that portion of her property that represents the property transferred by her for which
she had received no consideration. Brookes, "Tax Consequences of Widow's Elections In
Community Property States," 1951 UNIV. So. CAL. TAX INSTITUTE 83, 101 (1951).
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a taxable event and the property is taxable in her estate. Thus
the property excluded from the husband's estate is included in the
wife's estate at a later date.
The discrimination that exists between common law and community property states is a qualitative one. A type of settlement is
available in community property states that is denied to spouses in
common law states. How important in a quantitative sense the
life estate to wife, remainder over transfer is to families in common
law states we can only guess. We know, however, that this type of
disposition is a traditional one and that it is customarily employed
by testators to control the disposition of the non-deductible half of
their estates. As to the.deductible one-half, the testator must choose
between the immediate tax savings that result from the deduction
and the dangers of entrusting that half of his estate to his wife's
hands in the form of an absolute transfer.
Is this a proper result of a policy of integration when a community property husband can accomplish the result denied to his
counterpart in the common law state and still obtain the tax savings inherent in splitting the community estate? Does the terminable interest rule serve a useful purpose in achieving integration
if its effect can be avoided in community property states through
the medium of the widow's election? True, the widow's election
requires the consent of the widow to take effect, but is this family
agreement a sufficient reason to justify the complexities of the
terminable interest rule?
3. Effect of the Competency of the Surviving Spouse. Very
recently a potential area of serious discrimination between common law and community property states was eliminated by a ruling
of the Revenue Service.25 The question presented was this: what
effect does the mental competency of the surviving spouse to accept
and to dispose of property have on the marital deduction?
As a general rule, if a bequest is made directly and absolutely
to the surviving spouse, the decedent's estate will be entitled to
deduct it, regardless of the spouse's competency or incompetency.
All that needs to be done is to appoint a guardian for the purpose
of holding title to the property transferred. 26 The same, of course,
is true of a community property spouse's ownership of her property:
her disability does not deprive her of the ownership of her one-half.
Rev. Rul. 55-518, Int. Rev. Bul. 1955-33, 11.
Letter Ruling (unpublished), March 16, 1950, CCH FecL Estate and Gift Tax Rep.
112070.30 (1956).
25
26
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A problem arises, however, in certain cases in which less than
a full and absolute interest in fee is transferred to the surviving
spouse. Not all such transfers are disqualified by the terminable
interest rule. For example, a transfer in trust providing a life
estate to the wife together with a general power to appoint the
takers of the corpus on her death would qualify for the deduction
as one of the recognized exceptions to the terminable interest rule. 27
Generally, we find that any interest that is transferred to the
surviving spouse in such a manner that it would be taxable in her
estate (if she still possesses it at death) will qualify as a deductible
interest in the decedent's estate. Thus we have a number of fairly
common and well recognized exceptions to the terminable interest
rule; consider, for example, these illustrations:
(1) Transfer in trust, income to surviving spouse for life,
corpus to her estate.28
(2) Transfer in trust, income to surviving spouse for life,
corpus to whomever the surviving spouse may appoint. 29
(3) Transfer of life estate to surviving spouse, remainder to whomever the surviving spouse may appoint.30
(4) Payment of interest or installment amounts on life
insurance proceeds to surviving spouse, remainder of proceeds
at her death to whomever the surviving spouse may appoint.31
In all but the first case we find that the surviving spouse must be
given a power to appoint the corpus in order for the transfer to
qualify. For this purpose, of course, a power in the surviving spouse
to consume the corpus is the equivalent of a power to appoint.32
The problem that exists is this: if the surviving spouse must be
given a power over the corpus in addition to her life estate, will
27 One cannot help being wryly amused at this turnabout in legislative concern over
the qualitative integration of community property and common law concepts. As we
pointed out above, one of the reasons for disqualifying the life estate-remainder over
settlement was the alleged fact that such a settlement was not available to a testator in
community property states. Consider, however, the life estate plus power of disposition
type of settlement. It too is unavailable to testators in community property states unless
the consent of the testator's spouse is first obtained. But the latter qualifies for the
marital deduction whereas the former does not. Why the difference? In the latter case,
the property will be included in the surviving spouse'.s gross estate, but not in the former.
This factor, then, ought to be the true test of whether or not an interest is to be deductible:
any interest that would be includible in the survivor's estate ought to be deductible in the
decedent's estate.
28 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (5); Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47a (b) (2).
29 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (5); Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47a (c).
30 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (5).
31 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (6); Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47a (d); Rev. Rul. 55-277, Int. Rev. Bul.
1955-19, 22.
32 Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47a (c), (d).
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the transfer qualify in the event she is unable to exercise the power?
In other words, is it the existence of the power or its exercisability
that determines whether or not the deduction is allowable?
The code does not spell out the answer to this question. All
that section 2056 requires is that the power be "exercisable by such
spouse alone and in all events." 33 In the regulations we find an
amplification of this language, but with no direct answer to our
inquiry. The regulations state, "The power in the surviving
spouse is exercisable in all events only if it exists immediately following the decedent's death." 34 If our emphasis is correct that all
that is required is the existence of an unqualified power, then the
incapacity of the holder of the power would be immaterial.
This problem was touched upon but evaded by the Tax Court
in Estate of Frank E. Tingley. 35 There the testator had created a
life estate and power of complete invasion in his widow, subject
to a condition that her power "shall cease in the case of her legal
incapacity from any cause or upon the appointment of a guardian,
conservator, or other custodian of her person or estate." Although
the widow was at all times mentally responsible, the Commissioner
challenged the estate's right to deduct the value of this property as
part of its marital deduction. The Commissioner conceded that
the test of whether or not the power was "exercisable in all events"
had to be de~ermined as of the date of the testator's death. But,
he argued, on that date it was not absolutely certain that the
widow's power over the corpus was indefeasible. She would lose
the power if she later became incapacitated or a guardian were
appointed for her.
The court avoided a decision on this issue by interpreting the
testator's language to permit a forfeiture of the widow's power
under conditions short of legal incapacity. Concerning our problem, the court stated,
"If he [ the testator] had referred to legal incapacity alone,
the situation might well be different . . . [because] any surviving spouse with a power to appoint by will could later lose
the power . . . [ if she became] legally incapable of writing
a will exercising the power and Congress may not have intended that such an event by operation of law would deny the
marital deduction wherever the power was to be by will." 36
38!.R.C., §2056 (b) (5), (6).
34 Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47a (c). Emphasis added.
35 22 T.C. 402 at 405 (1954).
36 Judge Arundel! dissented in a succinct opinion that well summarizes the problem:
"The mere possibility that she would be deprived of her right to withdraw the property
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This case did, however, serve the purpose of dramatizing and
publicizing the problem. As a result when the Commissioner considered the effect of a person's incompetency under the inclusion of
property in his estate, he also ruled on the effect of incompetency
upon the marital deduction. The facts postulated in the ruling
were these: the surviving spouse had been made the life-time income beneficiary of her husband's trust erected in his will. She was
also granted a general power of consumption and disposition over
the trust corpus. But from the time of her husband's death to her
own demise she was mentally incompetent. Despite the fact that she
was never actually able to exercise the power granted her, the Commissioner ruled (1) that the corpus of the trust was includible in her
estate, and (2) that the value of the trust property at the time of her
husband's death qualified for the marital deduction.
Thus a potential threat of inequality between the two property
systems was eliminated. Apart from the violence that the ruling
may do to the literal language of the statute, we believe it clear
that the ruling is consistent (1) with the theory of equalization,
and (2) with the underlying principle that property includible in
the surviving spouse's estate ought to be deductible in the decedent's estate to the extent of one-half thereof.
4. Effect on Other Traditional Types of Property Settlements.
At common law a widow was entitled to dower in her husband's
lands on his death; customarily, dower gave her a life interest in
one-third of his real property. Similarly, a widower received an
estate in his wife's lands on her death known as curtesy; this estate
too consisted of a life interest, but in all, rather than in merely onethird, of his wife's real property.
Because both dower and curtesy create no more than a life
interest in the surviving spouse, both marital estates are disqualified under the terminable interest rule. 37 We may find it curious,
perhaps, that two of the traditional forms of passing property at
death between husband and wife fail to qualify for the very deduction that had been designed to lighten the tax load upon interspouse transfers. This means, of course, that these common law
forms of marital transfer will pretty well be abandoned by richer
should she be pronounced legally incompetent does not seem to me a valid reason for
denying the marital deduction. Such an unfortunate possibility always exists and would
operate effectively to extinguish the right of any surviving spouse to draw down property
given with the power to consume or appoint." Id. at 407.
37 Rev.

Rul. 279, 1953-2 Cum. Bul. 275 at 277.
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families simply because of the economic discrimination against
them. A premium has been placed upon the writing of a will by
residents of these states as a result of the discrimination against the
intestacy forms of transfer.
U_nder our modem law, both dower and curtesy have been
replaced by statutory substitutes. If these substitutes create no
more than a life interest, or interest otherwise terminable, in the
surviving spouse, then they too will be disqualified from the marital
deduction. 38 On the other hand, a statutory substitute that creates
a fee interest (or other similar non-terminable interest) in the
surviving spouse will be deductible.39
Similarly, under community property rules, the community
estate is automatically split between the spouses on the death
of one because of the equal ownership of each spouse in the community estate. Local property concepts give the estate the same
break as if the marital deduction were allowable.
What is the result? Has equalization been achieved? Consider
for a moment the plight of one who dies intestate. If he had the
good fortune to live in a community property state, his total community estate is automatically split with his spouse. If he resided
in a state that has retained common law dower, his estate loses the
marital deduction because of the terminable interest rule. If, on
the other hand, his state of residence provided a statutory substitute for dower that gives his widow a fee interest, the value of the
property transferred to her is deductible. 40
as Id. at 278 (discussing the Alabama substitute). The same rule is true as to allowances for support under local law. Rev. Rul. 83, 1953-1 Cum. Bul. 395, Rev. Rul. 56-26,
Int. Rev. Bul. 1956-5, 10; Estate of Nelson, 24 T.C. 30 (1955).
39 Pitts v. Hamrick, (4th Cir. 1955) 228 F. (2d) 486. See Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47a (b)
(I) (iii).
40 Not only is there a difference in result at the time the first spouse dies, but an additional discrimination occurs when the second dies. Here it appears that the community
property spouses are worse off. In the absence of a will, the decedent's half of the community customarily passes to the surviving spouse and will be includible in her estate on
her death, subject, of course, to a possible credit for the tax levied on the property in the
prior estate. In a common law dower state, all the property is taxed in the husband's
estate and none in the wife's. But in the common law substitute states, the husband will
be entitled to a deduction in his estate for his wife's statutory interest; on her death only
that interest will be included in her estate. On an oversimplified basis, we might consider
the following graphic comparison, assuming that the husband dies first.
% of both spouses'
Common law
Common law
Community
property included
dower
substitute
property
In H"s estate
100%
50%
50%
In W's estate
-050%
100%
Total included

100%

100%

150%
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This is not equalization. The availability of the marital deduction depends upon local property concepts, not upon whether or
not the surviving spouse is the beneficiary of the decedent's estate.
Because of the terminable interest rule, a decedent in a dower state
must execute a will in order to gain the benefit of the deduction;
his brethern in other states may obtain its benefits without writing
a will, provided their spouses survive them.
And so we find that a rule, that of the terminable interest,
designed to equalize the conflicts in· property systems may itself
be the cause of substantial inequality.

5. Effect on Annuities. Generally we think of annuities as
terminable interests. And, as terminable interests, we would expect to find them disqualified from the marital deduction. And,
on further reflection, we would agree that this is properly so. After
all, a husband in a community property state cannot create the
equivalent of an annuity in his wife's community property which
she owns outright. But, as we saw above, this test of what a community property spouse can or can not do is more illusory than real.
Actually an annuity is deductible or not depending upon
(I) what its terms are, and (2) who bought it. By this we mean
to imply that not all annuities are disqualified. In order to determine what types of annuities are deductible, we must retrace
our steps in analyzing the basic characteristic of a "terminable
interest." An interest can be considered terminable only if the
decedent has at some time split his ownership of the property
passing to the surviving spouse between her and some other person who will take the property after her.41 An annuity is a
terminable interest only if some interest in it passes to another
person after the death of the annuitant (in this case the surviving
spouse). We can imagine two situations in which this condition
would be present: (1) the surviving spouse's annuity contains a
refund feature that may be payable to a secondary beneficiary
on her premature death, or (2) the surviving spouse holds the
annuity jointly with another who may become the sole annuitant
as survivor. But if the annuity is payable only to the surviving
spouse for her life, without refund feature, it is n~t a terminable
interest. Nor would it be a terminable interest if the surviving
spouse's interest is that of a survivor annuitant on a joint and
survivor annuity. 42 A refund annuity in favor of the surviving
41 See discussion, Part B (1) supra.
42 Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47b (d), example

Tax Service, '1176,258, 1949.

(iv), Bureau Letter, May 12, 1949, P-H Federal
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spouse may also qualify in the event that the refund is payable
to her estate, not to any other person.43 In these cases, the surviving
spouse takes the entire interest in the annuity on the decedent's
death and no interest in it passes to another person (other than
her estate).
The second part of the test must also be met: who bought the
annuity is as important for the purpose of the terminable interest
rule as its type. The two examples of annuities discussed above
would be deductible only if purchased by the decedent himself.
If the annuities were bought by his executor out of the liquid
assets of his estate, the annuity would be disqualified even though
it is not technically a terminable interest.
Why this strange result? The short answer is found in the code
itself.44 Any interest that expires or lapses after a period of time is
considered non-deductible if purchased by the executor under
instructions from the decedent. It is immaterial whether or not
any other person may succeed to the interest after its failure in
~e hands of the surviving spouse. In other words, interests purchased by an executor under orders from the decedent are subject to a more restrictive terminable interest rule than those purchased by the decedent himself. 45
What does all of this add up to? First, we see that these rules
actually permit one to design an interest that is deductible in the
decedent's estate but yet is not taxable in the surviving spouse's.
Suppose, for example, a decedent, in a common law state, buys an
annuity out of his property for his wife. In order to prevent the
accrual of a gift tax, he retains all the incidents of ownership, including the right to surrender, until his death. The annuity falls
into his gross estate. Because it is not a terminable interest, his
estate is entitled to deduct it as part of the available marital deduction. The annuity, however, expires by its terms on the death
of his surviving spouse. Hence nothing is includible in her estate
43 S. Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bul. 285 at 339, 340. But because
an estate is not a permanent entity, the value of the refund will ultimately inure to the
benefit of a person other than the surviving spouse; yet the annuity is not deemed to be a
terminable interest.
44 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (1) (C).
45 Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47b (e). Parenthetically we should add that interests purchased
by an executor under a general direction to sell and invest are not disqualified merely because they may fail through the lapse of time; only if another person will succeed to the
interest on such failure will the interests brought under a general power be disqualified.
This liberalization is, of course, a rephrasing of the more usual terminable interest rule.
The restrictive rule applies only in the case of a particular direction to the executor to
purchase an obligation "the discharge of which would • • • have the effect of an annuity
for life or a term." S. Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bul. 285 at 340.
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on her death. Thus we can pass property to a surviving spouse
for her enjoyment without the burden of estate tax.es, either before
or after the transfer. 46
Again we must conclude that this is not equalization. Under
community property concepts, the surviving spouse owns a fee
interest in her one-half. But under this application of the marital
deduction formula, she owns only a contract right for installment
payments that will cease on her death. In a community property
state only the owner of the property could transmit his interest
into such an annuity. The husband, for instance, could not convert his wife's one-half share of the community into an annuity
owned solely by her without her consent.47 Thus, in this area we
find that qualitative inequality exists between the two property
systems, despite the adoption of the marital deduction and its
terminable interest rule.
6. Effect of the Rule of Strict Construction. The legislative
exceptions to the terminable interest disqualification48 have been
strictly construed and applied; by and large it is more common
for a contested deduction to be denied than to be sustained. And
in denying the deduction, the courts have been less concerned with
the underlying philosophy of the marital deduction than they
have been with maintaining the so-called legislative principle that
"deductions should be strictly construed against the tax.payer and
in favor of the sovereign." This attitude, too, has played its part
in subverting the original purpose of Congress of equalization between the different property systems.49
Consider first the exception for a life estate coupled with a
power of disposition over the corpus. Such a transfer was expressly
46 The price, of course, is the entire consumption of the property, which may be the
reason that this device has not appeared more attractive. If the future testator wants to
conserve any portion of the property, he ·can insert a provision for refund payable to his
spouse's estate in the event of her premature death. The value of such a refund would
not prevent the annuity from being deductible in his estate, but it would be includible as
part of the surviving spouse's estate.
47 It would require a partition of the community into two separate estates. If the husband purchased an annuity on her life, both he and she would own equal one-half interests
in it as long as it remained community property. DE FUNIAK, PRINCil'LES OF COMMUNITY
PROPER.TY §1 (1943).
48 See discussion at Part B (1) supra.
49 Perhaps only Congress should be blamed for these discrepancies between theory
and practice. At any rate, the attitude of the courts and the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue toward the marital deduction has forced Congress to lead the way in eliminating some of the more glaring errors in the judicial gloss that has been deposited upon
the marital deduction section since its inception. See §210, Technical Changes Act of 1953,
67 Stat. L. 615, 624, and compare I.R.C. (1939), §812 (e) (1) (F) and (G) with their counterparts, I.R.C. (1954), §2056 {b)(5) and (6).
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made deductible under the original language of the marital deduction section, provided the transfer was made in trust. 5° Consequently, if the equivalent transfer were made in terms of a legal
life estate coupled with a power of invasion or disposition over the
remainder, the transfer was held to be non-deductible, solely because it was not in trust. 51 Whether or not the property would be
includible in the surviving spouse's estate was 'immaterial; the
controlling question was whether the transfer was in trust or not
in trust.
Interestingly, we find that in ·certain of these cases dealing with
legal life estates, an argument has been made that the Rule in
Shelly's Case (or its statutory counterpart) transmutes the surviving
spouse's life interest plus the power to consume into a fee interest.
Hence, her interest being an absolute fee, it is deductible. Thus
far the argument has been rejected, but in each case the rejection
has been bottomed upon an analysis of local precedent.52 But if
local law determines this question,53 equalization would be hopeless of achievement.
This particular question has been eliminated for estates of
decedents who die after August 16, 1954. Equalization has been
obtained by rewriting the federal rule to include this situation.
Under the provisions of section 2056 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, an interest, whether legal or equitable, is deductible if a
life interest and power to appoint the remainder passes to the surviving spouse.54 According to the Senate Report, the amendment
was required "because of doubt under the law of the various States
as to what constitutes a 'trust' it is not clear when a legal life estate
.50 I.R.C. (1939), §812 (e)(l) (F) which reads in part as follows: "In the case of an interest in property passing from the decedent in trust, if under the terms of the trust his
surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the corpus of the trust ••• with
the power in the surviving spouse to appoint the entire corpus free of the trust. • • ."'
:51 Estate of Edward F. Pipe, 23 T.C. 99 at 104 (1954), on appeal to Second Circuit;
Estate of Michael Melamid, 22 T.C. 966 at 968 (1954); Estate of Frank E. Tingley, 22
T.C. 402 at 406 (1954), on appeal to First Circuit; Estate of Julius Selling, 24 T.C. 191 at
197 (1955), acq. on another point Int. Rev. Bul. 1955-40, 6, on appeal to Second Circuit.
52 Estate of Edward F. Pipe, 23 T.C. 99 at 101 (1954) (New York); Estate of Julius
Selling, 24 T.C. 191 at 197 (1955) (New York); Estate of Frank E. Tingley, 22 T.C. 402 at
406 (1954) (Rhode Island); Estate of Harrison P. Shedd, 23 T.C. 41 at 44 (1954), on appeal
to Ninth Circuit (Arizona).
53 Under the regulations, the Commissioner has assumed that local law controls this
question. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47b (d), example (ii). And in Estate of William Walker
Wynekoop, 24 T.C. 167 at 171 (1955), acq. Int. Rev. Bul. 1955-47, 6, the Tax Court used
local law to bail out the estate.
54 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (5) reads in part as follows: "In the case of an interest in property
passing from the decedent, if his surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income
from the entire interest • . • with power in the surviving_ spouse to appoint the entire
interest. •. .''
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will qualify as a trust." 55 One may properly wonder, in view of
this statement, whether or not the courts that had ruled on the
matter were right in their decision that only transfers meeting all
the traditional requirements of a trust would qualify.56
What of trust transfers themselves? Have the courts been restrictive or liberal in applying the statutory language of the marital
deduction? Again the record forces us to conclude that the courts
have lost sight of the underlying philosophy of the deduction in
their search for "jot and tittle" compliance with the statute.
Perhaps the most common mistake has arisen in the case of a
testator who wishes to qualify half his estate for the marital deduction by passing it to his wife and to pass the other half to his children subject to a life estate in his wife. Certainly there is nothing
improper in such a plan and it is common knowledge that this is
a typical family settlement. But what happens if the testator's
draftsman fails to state with specificity that the testator intended
to erect two trusts, one to his wife for life, remainder to children,
subject to his wife's power of appointment, and the other to his
wife for life, remainder to children, without a power of appointment in her? Suppose he just gives her a power of appointment
over one-half the corpus? Held, no deduction allowable. The
decedent had intended only one trust; because the surviving spouse
had been granted a power of appointment over only part of that
trust, her interest failed to qualify under the statute which requires
that her power extend to the "entire corpus."57
Again Congress has had to step in to correct a discrepancy between theory and practice. Section 2056 of the 1954 code now
permits a deduction for property transferred to the surviving spouse
for life, to the extent that she has a power of appointment over the
55 S. Rep. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d sess., 125 (1954).
56 In Estate of Edward F. Pipe, 23 T.C. 99 at 102

(1954), this contention was advanced:
the estate argued that under New York law a life tenant in possession was considered a
trustee holding the property for the ultimate benefit of the remainderman. The argument
was rejected in the Pipe case because Mrs. Pipe had been given more than a life estateshe had the power of disposition and of consumption as well. When you recall that the
court had already ruled that these additional powers were insufficient to give her a fee,
you realize that the court was paying only lip service to the concept of integrating the
husband's and wife's estates to prevent the double inclusion of the property.
57 Estate of Louis B. Hoffenberg, 22 T.C. 1185 at 1186 (1954), affd. per curiam sub
nom. Hoffenberg v. Commissioner, (2d Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 470; Estate of Harrison P.
Shedd, 23 T.C. 41 at 45 (1954) (where the court admitted "substantial compliance" with
the statute is "no compliance"); Estate of Arthur Sweet, 24 T.C. 488 (1955), on appeal
to Tenth Circuit; Estate of Frank Clifford Bickers, 14 T.C.M. 901 (1955), T.C. Memo.
1955-224; Rev. Rul. 54-20, 1954-1 Cum. Bul. 195.
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remainder. If the life estate and the power reach only part of the
corpus, the estate's deduction is limited to that part.58
Both of these trouble spots have been eliminated by corrective
legislation. But in view of the attitude of the courts, we may
fairly assume that new areas of controversy will arise. For instance,
what will be the result if the testator creates but one trust, with a
life estate in the whole to the surviving spouse but with a power
of appointment over only one-half the corpus? Will the courts
deny the deduction of one-half the trust property because the
surviving spouse's income and power interests are not co-terminous?
If we consider these cases and the judicial attitude they reflect
from the viewpoint of equalization, we see that they represent a
frustration of that objective. We find that in common law states,.
through inadvertence or error, property is taxed in first the husband's and then the wife's estates. The same situation cannot,
of course, arise as to community property because the interests of
the spouses are fixed by law, not by the endeavors of an estate
draftsman. And these interests control the incidence of federal
estate taxation.
C.

Elimination of Community Property From the Adjusted
Gross Estate

l. Introduction. As a matter of general principle, property
that is already split between the spouses should not also gain the
benefit of the marital deduction. If it did, the property would be
taxed only to the extent of one-fourth of its total value in the decedent's estate; the other three-quarters would not be taxable until
the death of the surviving spouse.59 Consequently, the statutory
framework of the deduction provides for the elimination of community property.
However, this scheme of elimination is not as simple as it may
seem. It would be unfair to withhold the deduction completely
from spouses in community property states because such spouses
may own property separately as well as in the community form.
58 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (5): "In the case of an interest ih property passing from the decedent, if his surviving spouse is entitled for life to all the income from the entire interest,
or all the income from a specific portion thereof . . . with power in the surviving spouse
to appoint the entire interest, or such specific portion. . . •" A similar amendment has
been made to cover the handling of insurance proceeds. I.R.C., §2056 (b) (6). Cf. Rev. Rul.
1954-553, 1954-2 Cum. Bui. 303; Estate of Joseph E. Reilly, 25 T.C. No. 46 (1955).
59 This result would be no worse than that obtaining to a common law husband
who gives half of his property to his wife before death. He is taxable on only one-quarter,
and the other three-quarters (less than consumed) are taxed in his wife's estate.
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And if a husband or wife acquires property separately, it is not
split between them in ownership as it would be if acquired as
community property. 60 On the death of the owner, separate property is included in full in his estate; hence, if no deduction were
allowable to the owner, he would be unable to split that part of his
estate with his surviving spouse. In other words, the owner of
separate property would be placed in the same position as a property owner in a common law state prior to the Revenue Act of 1948.
For this reason the marital deduction was not completely denied
to the community property states. Instead, the deduction was
made available in community property states, but on a reduced
basis. The approach of the statute was to require that all community property be eliminated from the adjusted gross estate
limitation placed upon the amount of the deduction. Thus the
ceiling on the marital deduction allowable was lowered, pro tanto,
by the value of all community property included in the decedent's
gross estate. By lowering the ceiling, Congress hoped to eliminate
the possibility that community property spouses would realize a
double deduction on the death of the first spouse.
An example will make the mechanics of this reduction clear.
Suppose Hand W have amassed a community estate of $400,000.
On H's death, one-half ($200,000) of this amount is includible in
his estate. But in order to compute H's adjusted gross estate, H's
executor must first reduce his gross estate by the amount of community property included in it. 61 -Because the entire estate consists of H's interest in their community property, H's executor must
reduce the gross estate by itself; consequently, the adjusted gross
estate is zero and H's estate is entitled to no marital deduction.
But suppose H had also been possessed of $150,000 of separate
property, acquired by him from the estate of his father. In this
case H's estate would total $350,000, including his $200,000 interest
in the community estate. Again H's executor must reduce the
gross estate by the amount of community property included in it.
Thus the $350,000 estate is reduced by $200,000, leaving an adjusted gross estate of $150,000. Because the maximum marital
deduction allowed would be 50 percent of the adjusted gross
estate, H could pass up to $75,000 to Was a deductible transfer. 62
60 DE FUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY §1 (1943).
61 I.R.C., §2056 (c) (2) (B); Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47d (b).
62 This illustration has been oversimplified. In addition to the

reduction for community property, H's executor must also reduce H's gross estate by claims, expenses and
losses. I.R.C., 2056 (c) (2) (A). Because H's community interest is being eliminated in toto
under another reduction clause, the reduction for claims, expenses and losses is confined
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One further principle should be kept in mind. It is immaterial
whether the decedent passes his interest in community property or
in separate property to his surviving spouse. If he has an adjusted
gross estate, either type of property passed to his surviving spouse
will qualify for the marital deduction. 63 From a practical standpoint, this liberalization does no harm, because it is impossible to
use it to gain a double deduction; all that it accomplishes is to give
the estate planner in a community property state a greater degree
of flexibility in deciding which property shall pass to the surviving
spouse and which shall go to other beneficiaries. But it is only
when the gross estate includes some separate property that the
deduction· _is allowable at all.
'This is the basic approach of the statute; only where separate
property (or its statutory equivalent) is encompassed in the gross
estate will any marital deduction be allowable. The statutory
approach appears fair enough on its face. But, as always, we must
ask: how has it worked out?

2. Separate Property Resulting from a Conversion of Community Property. Because it is normally possible for spouses in a
community property state to convert their interests in community
property into separate property, Congress had to engraft a further
protective device upon the reduction clauses of the adjusted gross
estate. Otherwise a double deduction could be obtained by the
simple expedient of converting all of the spouses' community
property into separate property; then, in the absence of this additional protective device, the decedent might die leaving an adjusted
gross estate equal to his separate property and thus qualify for the
marital deduction an estate that had already been split between the
spouses through its former community ownership.
To eliminate this possibility, Congress required that the gross
estate be reduced by "converted community property," as well as
by community property, in the process of computing the decedent's
to only those claims, expenses and losses attributable to non-community property. I.R.C.,
§2056 (c) (2) (B) (iv). For the purpose of deciding which claims, etc., are attributable to
community property and which to separate property, an arbitrary apportionment is made
based upon the proportion that· the community property included in the estate bears to
the entire gross estate. We have the following formula:
Amount of reduction
Gross estate less
for claims, expenses
community property
and losses
Total claims, exGross estate
penses and losses
63 S.

Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bui. 285 at 345.
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adjusted gross estate. By "converted community property" we
mean any separate property of the decedent that was acquired by
him in exchange for his interest in community property. 64
Basically, what this device does is to freeze property for the purpose of the marital deduction into community property if it was
at any time acquired as community property. It makes no difference how the property may have been transformed or exchanged
prior to death. Neither a change in form of ownership nor a
partition of the property will be recognized; if the altered property
is included in the decedent's gross estate, it must be excluded from
his adjusted gross estate just as if it retained its character as community property to the date of his death.
These principles are pervasive and far-reaching; they exclude
not only partitioned community property but also newly-acquired
property purchased with funds derived from property that was
formerly community property. It is easily possible to conjure
up situations in which property that never was itself community
property receives the same treatment as community property under
these rules. 65 Thus the problem of eliminating community property from the adjusted gross estate often becomes a nasty problem in
itself.
And added to this basic problem are the complications that
arise in the case of an unequal conversion of community property
-one in which one spouse gets a larger share than his one-half of
the community. If such a col?-version were made, the spouse receiving the larger share would ordinarily be treated as having made a
gift of one-half of the excess to the other. For the purpose of the
marital deduction this excess property is treated as true separate
property in the estate of whichever spouse acquires it; consequently, it need not be eliminated from the adjusted gross estate
as converted community property. 66
An example may serve to clarify this statutory refinement to
the concept of converted community property. Suppose H and W
agree to a conversion of their community property, H taking a car
§2056 (c)(2)(C).
•
way of illustration, consider the case where a husband agrees that his wife's
earnings are to be her separate property. Suppose W carefully keeps her earnings and does
not commingle them with community funds in a joint or community bank account. And
suppose she buys in her own name a car which is her separate property. If she dies first,
her adjusted gross estate would not include the value of her car because the car had been
acquired "by the decedent in exchange • • • (for) property held as such community prop•
erty.'' See Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47 (d) (b).
66 I.R.C., §2056 (c) (2) (C) (ii).
64 I.R.C.,

65 By
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and stocks worth $20,000, and W holding out for their home worth
$30,000. If H dies first, all of the property received by him in the
conversion would be excluded from his adjusted gross estate; he
received none of the excess and therefore all of his separate property
was a product of his one-half community interest. But if W dies
first, a different result obtains. W received $10,000 in excess of
H's share. Therefore only $20,000 of her interest in the home is
treated as converted community property; the remainder is treated
as her separate property and is includible as part of her adjusted
gross estate. 67 These rules relating to conversions are restricted
only to the amount of separate property received by the decedent
in the conversion that is not in excess of the amount received by
his spouse.
All of these safeguards, as we have seen, are necessary to carry
out the basic purpose of equalization. Unless we had these exclusionary rules relating to converted community property, spouses in
community property states could readily evade the restrictions on
the use of community property by merely changing the form of
their holdings from community to separate property.
But there is still one area into which these conversion rules do
not reach. If the spouses converted their community ownership
into separate property prior to January I, 1942, then the property
is treated as separate property for the purposes of the marital deduction. 68 In this one situation, the spouses may build up an adjusted
gross estate out of separate property previously converted from
community property and thereby pay a tax on only one-quarter
the entire community estate on the first death. In other words, as
to this property the equivalent of a "double deduction" is available.69
67 If the values of the separate property obtained as a result of the conversion change
before death, the amount of converted community property and excess separate property
is determined by applying the ratio that these two types of property bore to one another
when converted. This conversion ratio is then used to divide the total value at death of
the property resulting from the original conversion. Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47d (b), example
(2). See also the example appearing in S. Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bui.
285 at 345-346.
68 I.R.C., §2056 (c) (2) (C) (i).
69 Under the 1939 code, this "double deduction" of converted community property was
available not only for conversions occurring before January 1, 1942, but also for conversions
made in the period January 1, 1943 to April 2, 1948. I.R.C. (1939), §812 (e) (2) (C) (i). This
supplementary period of grace was stricken out of the Revenue Act of 1954 as introduced
in bill form in the House of Representatives. See H.R. 8300, §2056, 83d Cong., 2d sess.
(1954). No explanation for dropping the supplementary period was given in the Committee Report, H. Rep. 1337, 83d Cong, 2d sess., A319 (1954). The explanation may lie,
however, in the adoption of the Revenue Service of the theory of Commissioner v. Mills,
(9th Cir. 1950) 183 F. (2d) 32. There the court invalidated a treasury regulation that
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To this extent, at least, we find that the reduction clauses are
not accomplishing full parity between the two systems of ownership. The disparity, however, is diminishing because the cut-off
date, January 1, 1942, is receding year by year and the amount of
property qualifying for this special benefit is steadily diminishing.
. This special advantage cannot, of course, be obtained for any new
community property owners who were not already entitled to it
on January 1, 1942.
3. Exceptions to the Reduction for Community Property
Clauses. Not all community property falls under these rules outlined above. According to the code, only community property
that is split between the spouses for federal estate tax purposes
must be eliminated from the adjusted gross estate; 70 other types of
community property are included as part of the adjusted gross
estate just as separate property is included.71
The regulations have restated this test positively to permit the
inclusion in the decedent's adjusted gross estate of any community
property "in which the surviving spouse had at such time merely
an expectant interest." 72 The most prominent illustration of this
type of property is "pre-'27" community property in California.
Prior to July 29, 1927, a California wife had not much more than
an expectancy in community property; she had to survive her husband to take her one-half. Hence, when the husband died, the
entire community was included in his gross estate for estate tax
purposes.73 Because the entire property is included in the husband's gross estate, it all qualifies for his adjusted gross estate.74
purported to treat all conversions of community property into separate property as taxable gifts of the husband if made after December 31, 1941 and prior to the Revenue Act of
1948. See Treas. Reg. 108, §86.2 (c). If these conversions were no longer to be treated as
gifts when made, the reason for giving them special treatment under the marital deduction
reduction clauses disappeared. See T.D. 6015, 1953-1 Cum. Bul. 396.
70 I.R.C., §2056 (c) (2) (B), which reads in part: "For purposes of clauses (i), (ii), and
(iii), community property ••• shall be considered as not 'held as such community property'
as of any moment of time, if, in the case of the death of the decedent at such moment,
such property (and not merely one-half thereof) would be or would have been includible
in determining the value of his gross estate. . . ."
71 With the exception, of course, of property which traces its ancestry to community
property of a type that is split between the spouses; such converted community property
is treated the same as the property from which it is descended.
72 Treas. Reg. 105, §81.47d (b) (i).
73 Talcott v. United States, (9th Cir. 1928) 23 F. (2d) 897 at 901, cert. den. 277 U.S.
604, 48 S.Ct. 601 (1928); T.D. 3891, V-2 Cum. Bul. 232 (1926). California has since
amended her statutes to grant a wife "a present, existing and equal interest" in community property during her lifetime. Cal. Civ. Code (West, 1954) §16la.
74 S. Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bul. 285 at 345.
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From the viewpoint of equalization, we cannot quarrel ~ith this
result. This particular type of community property is treated in
the same manner as property in common law states both for the
purpose of inclusion in the gross estate and of qualifying for the
marital deduction.
The other side of the coin presents the other basic exception
· to these community property rules. Suppose the wife dies first in
a state in which her community interest is a mere expectancy. She
forfeits her interest on death. Hence no part of the community
estate is taxable in her gross estate. And, naturally, no part of the
property would qualify for the marital deduction. 75
Again we cannot quarrel with the result; it seems entirely consistent with the treatment of common law property. On the other
hand, what we said in criticism of the equalization between common law and community property systems when the wife dies first
applies equally well here. As to "pre-'23" California and as to
New Mexico community property, the death of the wife causes no
tax liability to accrue. Contrast this with the case of ordinary
community property; on the wife's death, one-half of the community estate is taxable in her gross estate.
But other complications may also ensue. It is even possible
for conflicting results to obtain in one community property state
as to the same property. For example, in 1923, California wives
were given a power of disposition over their half interests in the
community estate.76 This power was sufficient to require the
inclusion of a wife's community interest in her estate if she died
first. But if her husband died first, the entire community estate
was included in his gross estate.77
The application of the principles of the reduction clauses may
lead to the curious result that certain property will qualify for the
marital deduction in one spouse's estate, but not in· the other's!
These cross-currents in the community property system create
75 This apparently is the situation in New Mexico. Hernandez v. Becker, (10th Cir.
1931) 54 F. (2d) 542. But see the acidulous comments of Robert Emmet Clark in "Another Community Property Anomaly,'' 11 TAX L. REv. 76 at 82 (1955) on this decision.
Until recently, it was the rule in Nevada. In 1955, however, the Commissioner reversed
his original ruling to take the position that one-half of the community estate is taxable on
the wife's death. Rev. Ru!. 55-605, Int. Rev. Bul. 1955-40, 10. And prior to 1923, when
the wife was granted a power of disposition over her half, it must have been the rule in
California.
76 1923 Stat. L. (California), c. 18, p. 29.
77 See authorities cited in note 73 supra.
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situations where there is no more equalization among the community property states themselves than there is between community
property and common law property.
4. Conclusion. By and Jarge the rules relating to the treatment of community property under the marital deduction have
achieved the result of preventing a double deduction. To that
extent at least, these rules have accomplished equalization. But
other aspects of this treatment leave us more dubious. The rules
relating to separate property result in equating separate property
with common law property under the deduction. Thus, the same
types of discrimination that exist between common law and community property are extended to community and separate property.
On the other hand, nothing is done to lessen or to eliminate these
disparities as to community property itself.
In other words, we can sum up the community property provisions of the marital deduction by saying that they eliminate the
possibility of reducing. the first spouse's estate to one-quarter of
the total. The same possibility has not, however, been eliminated
in common law states. There a spouse may confidently give away
half his estate before death and still qualify for the full marital
deduction when he dies. These provisions obviously leave much
to be desired.

D.

Problems of Planning for Administration

I. Introduction. Several problems arise in the planning of
an estate for administration on the death of the testator that may
give rise to inequalities between the two property systems. Among
these problems are the questions (1) of how the estate tax is to be
apportioned among the beneficiaries of the estate, (2) of the
manner in which the surviving spouse's share will be treated under
concepts of local probate administration, (3) of the local death
duties payable on the surviving spouse's share, and (4) of the
property to be selected for transfer to the surviving spouse for her
enjoyment after the testator's death.
2. Who Pays the Tax? One anomaly that has appeared in
the administration of the marital deduction is the problem of who
bears the burden of the estate tax on the decedent's estate: all of
the beneficiaries of his estate? Or all beneficiaries other than the
surviving spouse if her legacy is tax deductible?
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Naturally this is no problem under community property concepts. The surviving spouse takes her one-half share undiminished
by a levy for any share of the estate tax on her husband's half interest. She owned her community interest prior to the decedent's
death and her interest does not fall into his gross estate.78
But in common law states the problem is a perennial one. It
arises out of the statutory language of the marital deduction itself.
Section 2056 specifically requires that "there shall be taken into
account the effect which the (federal estate tax) . . . or any
estate, succession, legacy, or inheritance tax, has on the net value
of the surviving spouse of . . . (the interests passing to her and
qualifying for the deduction)." 79
As a matter of basic interpretation, what this proviso does is
to reduce the amount of any marital transfer by the amount of
any federal or state tax chargeable to the property passing from
the decedent to his spouse. Naturally, if the amount of property
transferred to the spouse exceeds the maximum marital deduction
by the amount of the tax, this subsection makes no difference; the
amount of the marital transfer, even after reduction for taxes, still
exceeds the maximum amount deductible. Hence the full marital
deduction, equal to one-half the adjusted gross estate, is deductible.
But in any case in which the property transferred to the surviving spouse is about equal to, or is less than, the maximum deductible, the amount of federal and state taxes apportioned to the
spouse's share of the estate will reduce her share; consequently, the
amount deductible is also reduced. An example may make this
clear: suppose H dies leaving a taxable estate of $500,000, passing
$250,000 to W, all of which qualifies for the marital deduction.
But a state inheritance tax of $10,000 is levied against the transfer
to her. Under this subsection, the amount of the marital deduction
is reduced from $250,000 to $240,000, which is equal to the net
amount passed to her.
In the case of the federal estate tax, which is a tax payable out
of the entire estate, not a charge against a specific legacy, the testa78 This result occurs even in the case where the surviving spouse elects to have her
community interest administered in her spouse's estate for probate purposes. Estate of
Buckhantz, 120 Cal. App. (2d) 92, 260 P. (2d) 794 (1953). Compare Estate of Cushing,
ll3 Cal. App. (2d) 319, 248 P. (2d) 482 (1952), which dealt with the analogous problem of computing the state inheritance tax on the decedent's community estate if he
leaves his entire community interest to his surviving spouse.
79 I.R.C., §2056 (b) (4) (A). See S. Rep. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bul.
285 at 335.
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tor may control its payment by will. He can, if he wishes, have
property other than that passing to his spouse bear the primary
responsibility for the tax. The effect will be to protect the marital
legacy from reduction for taxes; consequently, the marital deduction available to his estate will not be reduced for any share of the
taxes.
If he fails to provide expressly for the payment of taxes, the
general rule, in the absence of a state statute, is that the federal
estate tax is payable out of the residual estate. 80 Where the marital
transfer is made a part of the residuary share, the marital deduction
may be reduced by the entire amount of the estate tax payable on
the entire estate; and because the marital deduction is decreased,
the amount of estate tax liability incurred will be increased.81
This result occurs whenever the amount of the surviving spouse's
residual share is less than the maximum marital deduction plus
estate taxes. To prevent this result, the testator must either provide for apportionment of the tax liability in his• will or forego
the use of a residual bequest to his spouse.82
In certain jurisdictions we find that specific apportionment
statutes have been enacted. These statutes direct that the federal
estate tax burden be apportioned among the beneficiaries of the
estate according to their respective shares in the estate, ''except that
in making such proration allowances shall be made for any exemption granted by the act imposing the tax and for any deductions
allowed by such act for the purpose of arriving at the value of the
net estate. . . ." 83
so Harrison v. Northern Trust Co., 317 U.S. 476, 63 S.Ct. 361 (1943).
81 See Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E. (2d) 9 (1952), where the estate
represented to the court that an apportionment of the estate tax burden to the widow's
share of the estate would so decrease the marital deduction that the overall federal estate tax burden would be increased $50,0001 The court held for the widow on this argument and charged her share with no part of the federal estate tax burden despite the
fact that Ohio had no apportionment statute. The case was subsequently overruled in
Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E. (2d) 695 (1954), cert. den. 349 U.S. 9ll,
75 S.Ct. 600 (1955). In Wachovia Bank &: Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654,. 73 S.E. (2d)
879 (1953), the difference in the tax was over $265,000, and In re Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis.
362, 59 N.W. (2d) 641 (1953), about $415,000.
82 See Estate of Rosalie Cahn Morrison, 24 T.C. 965 (1955), where, simply because
the transfer was not made in the residuary estate, the Commissioner lost his battle to reduce the marital transfer by a part of the federal estate tax burden. And see Baylor v.
Nat. Bank of Commerce, 194 Va. 1, 72 S.E. (2d) 282 (1952), where the testator had made
express provision for apportionment in his will.
83 This is the language of §124.1 of the New York Decedent's Estate Law (McKinney,
1949) before the 1950 amendments to it; the pre-1950 language served as the model for
most of the other apportionment statutes. The 1950 version of the act was more specific,
providing that "any exemption or deduction allowed under the law imposing the tax by
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This language has not given the courts any particular compass
bearing in reaching a decision as to whether or not the marital
transfer should be assigned a portion of the federal levy. The
cases under it are conflicting. On the one hand, it has provided
sufficient justification for freeing the surviving spouse's share from
any part of the estate tax burden; the theory expressed by the courts
reaching this result is that because the surviving spouse's share has
not contributed to the estate tax burden (it being deductible), it
need not contribute to the tax burden levied on the estate.84
But, on the other hand, this is not the sole interpretation. Other
courts have held that the language requires no more than a straight
pro rata apportionment of the net estate tax burden among the
various beneficiaries; exemptions and deductions are to be taken
into account only to determine the tax.able estate; whatever tax
results from that determination is made a charge against each beneficiary according to his share in ~e total estate. 85
Because of the substantial difference in tax results, litigants in
states not having an apportionment statute are urging their courts
to adopt a judicially created rule of apportionment. To a very
limited extent this approach has succeeded. 86 But by and large
the courts have refused to apply any rule of "equitable apportionment." These latter courts reason that the absence of a specific
apportionment statute is almost conclusive evidence that the doctrine of apportionment is not the law of the jurisdiction.87
reason of the relationship of any person to the decedent ..• shall inure to the benefit
of such person bearing such relationship .•••" N.Y. Decedent's Estate Law (McKinney,
1949; Supp. 1955) §124(3).
84 In re Peter's Will, 88 N.Y.S. (2d) 142 (1949), affd. per curiam 275 App. Div. 950,
89 N.Y.S. (2d) 651, appears to be the grandfather of this theory. Accord: In re Wolf's
Estate, 307 N.Y. 280, 121 N.E. (2d) 224 (1954); Jerome v. Jerome, 139 Conn. 285, 93 A.
(2d) 139 (1952); In re Rosenfield's Estate, 376 Pa. 42, 101 A. (2d) 684 (1954); Estate of
Buckhantz, 120 Cal. App. (2d) 92, 260 P. (2d) 794 (1953); In re Fuch's Estate, (Fla. 1952)
60 S. (2d) 539.
85 Weinberg v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore, 198 Md. 539, 85 A. (2d) 50
(1951); Williamson v. Williamson, (Ark. 1954) 272 S.W. (2d) 72.
86 Lincoln Bank & Trust Co. v. Huber, (Ky. 1951) 240 S.W. (2d) 89; Pitts v. Hamrick,
(4th Cir. 1955) 228 F. (2d) 486 (applying a decision of South Carolina probate court);
Weyenberg v. United States, (D.C. Wis. 1955) 135 F. Supp. 299 (applying a Wisconsin
probate court decision); and see Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St. 475, 104 N.E. (2d) 9
(1952), subsequently overruled.
87 Northern Trust Co. v. Wilson, 344 Ill. App. 508, 101 N.E. (2d) 604 (1951); In re
Uihlein's Will, 264 Wis. 362, 59 N.W. (2d) 641 (1953); Moorman v. Moorman, 340 Mich.
636, 66 N.W. (2d) 248 (1954); Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Green, 236 N.C. 654, 73 S.E.
(2d) 879 (1953); Campbell v. Lloyd, 162 Ohio St. 203, 122 N.E. (2d) 695 (1954), cert. den.
349 U.S. 911, 75 S.Ct. 600 (1955).
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This discussion points to the obvious conclusion that there is
no uniformity among the states in regard to the sharing of the estate
tax load by the surviving spouse. And, consequently, there is no
uniformity in whether or not the available marital deduction is
to be reduced for a share of the estate taxes. Uniformity in practice is attainable only by making express provision in the decedent's will.88
In one apportionment area, at least, we thought uniformity
had been achieved. That area pertains to the right of an executor
to obtain contribution for a share of the estate tax burden from
beneficiaries who have received property from the decedent outside the probate estate but in such manner that the property falls
into the decedent's gross estate for federal estate tax purposes. For
instance, in the case of life insurance beneficiaries, the Internal
Revenue Code expressly creates a right of contribution, making the
insurance beneficiary liable to the estate for a pro rata share of the
federal estate burden, except that "this section shall not apply to
such proceeds (received by a surviving spouse) except as to the
amount thereof in excess of the aggregate amount of the marital
deduction allowed. . . ."89 The same rule of contribution exists
in favor of the estate against persons who receive property because
of a power held by the decedent in such manner as to include the
property in his gross estate.90
A fair inference to be drawn from this language is that a surviving spouse's share is exempt from making a contribution to the
extent that her share is deductible and therefore did not contribute
88 This was the answer given by the dissenters in Miller v. Hammond, 156 Ohio St.
475, 104 N.E. (2d) 9 at 19 (1952). If the testator wants equality with community property
states he can obtain it merely by so providing in his will; and, the dissenters went on
to point out, the testator doesn't have the disadvantage inherent in community property:
he is not required to give his surviving spouse as much property as she is entitled to under
community property laws! As a matter of estate draftsmanship, we might point out the
most advantageous tax apportionment clause is one that would not only protect the
marital deduction but also eat into any part of the marital transfer in excess of the
deduction. The reason for this conclusion should be obvious: any transfer to the surviving
spouse in excess of the amount deductible will be taxed in both the decedent's and the
surviving spouse's estates before passing to the second generation beneficiaries. There•
fore, rather than have this excess amount transferred to the surviving spouse, you may
find it more economical to apply it to the payment of estate taxes on the decedent's estate.
In order to achieve this end, you might provide a tax apportionment clause that would
apportion the estate tax first to the share of the surviving spouse to the extent, and only
to the extent, that it exceeds the maximum marital deduction allowable. The remainder
of the estate tax would be apportioned pro rata to all other beneficiaries.
89 I.R.C., §2206.
90 I.R.C., §2207; in both cases, the right of contribution may be waived by the de•
cedent in his will.
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to the measure of the tax. But this is not the interpretation placed
upon the section by one of the probate courts that has ruled on
the matter.
In Weinberg v. Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore,91 the
court took the position that the federal statute was intended to
apply only to insurance proceeds payable to a surviving spouse in
excess of the deductible amount. Hence, as to the amount qualifying for the marital deduction, the federal provision did not apply .
and the local apportionment statute governed. Because the court
had already interpreted its o,vn apportionment statute to require
contribution of a pro rata share of federal estate taxes from a surviving spouse's share even when deductible, the wife's share of the
insurance proceeds was also subject to contribution. The fact
that the entire amount had been a deductible amount in the decedent's gross estate was immaterial.
Thus, we are furnished with an example of the projection of
local inequalities, arising out of local law, into an area for which
Congress had attempted to legislate a uniform rule. It would be
hard to find a better example of the extreme difficulties of writing
a uniform rule of equalization for application among the several
states and their varied property systems.
3. Double Probate Expenses and Death Duties. As those who
practice in common law states know, the marital deduction is not
an unmixed blessing. In practice the theoretical saving provided
by the use of the maximum deduction is often not realized in full
measure. One reason for this is the presence of local fees, taxes
and expenses that are levied on the probate of an estate. Compare, for example, these charges on a marital deduction type of
settlement versus a life estate remainder over settlement. At the
time of the decedent's death probate fees and death duties are incurred on the entire estate. If the property is given outright to the
surviving spouse, a second round of probate fees and death duties
will be levied on the property on her death.
On the other hand, had the testator foregone the saving of a marital deduction transfer, he might have saved the second levy of fees
and taxes by creating only a life estate in the surviving spouse;
hence, on her death there would be no property in her estate to
administer because the remainder interest in the property has al91 198

Md. 539, 85 A. (2d) 50 (1951).
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ready been transferred directly to the second generation beneficiaries.92 Thus the saving in fees and taxes must, in many cases,
be considered as an offset to the saving of the marital deduction and
must be borne in mind in determining how desirable the deduction actually is.
A number of states have eliminated this problem in regard to
taxes by providing for a marital deduction modeled upon the
federal prototype.93 In such a jurisdiction there would be no
doubling of state taxes because presumably a transfer that qualifies
for the federal deduction would also qualify for the state marital
deduction. The problem of double costs of administration would
still exist even in these jurisdictions, however.
What we have said about the possible offsetting loss for double
taxes and expenses under a marital deduction transfer does not
apply to community property estates. In the latter case each
spouse's community interest bears its own taxes and costs of administration. Each spouse's interest is treated as his own estate
on his death; the interest of the surviving spouse is not administered
in the estate of the decedent and suffers no diminution for taxes
and expenses until it is probated on the subsequent death of its
owner.94
To this extent, then, a saving in costs and local taxes is available
to community property spouses that may be denied to their counterparts under the common law system. So long as the terminable
interest rule forces the decedent to leave his property to the surviving spouse in such fashion that it will fall into her estate on her
death, this disparity will exist.
92 This statement is not intended to imply that the price for escaping a second round
of costs of administration and death duties is the loss of the marital deduction. An astute
estate planner working within the framework of a given jurisdiction can frequently figure
out transfers that will accomplish both results. We are also ignoring the costs of terminating a life tenancy of record under local procedure.
93 Without attempting to be all-inclusive, we find that at least two states (New York
and North Dakota) have made provision for a marital deduction: N.Y. Tax Law (McKinney, 1954) §249-s; N.D. Rev. Code (Supp. 1953) §57-3711 (2). Similarly, California
exempts 50% of the decedent's separate property, if that amount is transferred to his
surviving spouse. Cal. Revenue and Taxation Code (Deering, 1952) §13805.
94 Invariably, it seems we must recoguize an exception. In many community property
states, as in the case of the widow's election discussed above, the surviving spouse may elect
to have her community interest administered in her husband's estate. In this case, it would
bear a pro rata share of the costs of administration, but not of taxes. However, on her
subsequent death, a separate administration of her community interest would not be necessary.

1128

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 54

4. Choice of Assets. As we have pointed out previously, the
community interests of husband and wife are equal undivided interests in all the property held by them in community ownership.
Neither spouse can pick and choose which specific community
assets he wishes to own for himself; if he makes an effort to do so
and obtains his spouse's consent to his sole ownership, he effects
a conversion of the community ownership of the property into
separate ownership. This conversion would be accomplished
either by way of gift or exchange, depending upon the circumstances.
But their counterparts under the common law system labor in
no such strait jacket.95 In framing a marital deduction bequest,
a spouse at common law is fairly free in his will to make whatever
selection of assets he wishes between his marital bequest and other
settlements. The proper use of this power to select is an important
function of the estate planner in framing a marital deduction
bequest most advantageously for his clients. A short discussion
of these points will make this advantage clear.
First, as a general rule the testator should segregate his wasting
assets and place them in the marital deduction transfer. By
"wasting assets" is meant such properties as annuities, patents, copyrights, mineral leases, leaseholds, life estates (per autre vie), estates
for years, insurance renewal commissions, etc., none of which are
technically terminable interests in themselves.96 These assets will
be deductible in the decedent's gross estate at their full value as of
the date of death or the date of optional valuation, whichever is
selected. But because these assets are wasting, they may have disappeared completely on the death of the surviving spouse or else
have become substantially depreciated in value. Hence little or
nothing will be included in her estate and the family unit may
escape estate taxation on them. What greater advantage could
one desire?
Second, in the process of selecting assets for the marital bequest,
the testator should keep in mind the income tax consequences of his
95 Again we must point out a possible area of disagreement with the statement in the
text. In most states a surviving widow is given an election to take against the will if she
feels her husband has not treated her generously in his will. And her interests in his
estate, assertable by her under such an election, would be analogous to a community
spouse's interest in the community estate. It would reach all the assets equally and be
an undivided interest therein until the date of partition by order of the probate court
setting aside specific assets in satisfaction qf her statutory interest.
96 See discussion, Part B, 1 supra.
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selection. For example, if his surviving spouse already possesses
sufficient income to take care of her needs, he should refrain from
giving her additional high income-producing properties. The tax
rate on the income from these properties may virtually nullify the
benefit of the bequest to her. Hence he may be well advised to
s.elect assets that produce little or no income for transfer to her.
Among these would be works of art, personal objects, personal
automobiles, the family home (none of which produces income),
or income properties that produce high deductions to offset income, such as oil investments (depletion) or hotels (depreciation).
Third, assets should be selected with an eye to their treatment
under state inheritance tax laws. If exemptions or exclusions are
provided for certain types of properties, such as insurance proceeds,
assets of this nature, such as insurance policies, should be transferred to the surviving spouse; on her subsequent death, these
assets will then qualify for the exemption and not suffer diminution through a second levy of inheritance taxes.
These are advantages available to an estate planner that he may
properly make use of in framing an estate plan in the best interests
of his clients. Such planning has become, for obvious reasons, an
integral part of marital deduction planning. It has, however, no
counterpart in community property planning and to that extent
represents a substantial advantage over the concepts of community
estates.

IL

EQUALIZATION UNDER THE FEDERAL GIFT

TAX

A. Statutory Framework
The federal gift tax imposes a tax upon all gifts made by a
person to another; the rate of tax imposed is progressive, rising
from 2¼ percent on the first $5,000 of taxable gifts to a maximum
rate of 57¾ percent. The rate is roughly three-quarters of the
estate tax rate for the equivalent brackets.
Provision was made in the Revenue Act of 1948 to permit
spouses to elect to split gifts made by one of them to a third party
between themselves for the purpose of computing the tax on the
gifts; this provision was introduced for the purpose of equalizing
the tax treatment of gifts made from a spouse's separate property
with that accorded to gifts made from community property.97
97 I.R.C.,

§2513. See H. Rep. 1274, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bul. 241 at 260-261.
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Provision was also made for gifts inter spouse. In community
property states each spouse is presumed to have contributed equally
to the acquisition of compunity property; hence the creation of
equal undivided interests in community property is not created as
a taxable gift by one spouse to another. Consequently, the
Revenue Act of 1948 attempted to duplicate in common law states
this tax-free splitting of community property by providing for a
tax-deductible method of transferring interests between spouses.98
The device used was to write the concept of a marital deduction
into the federal gift tax.
Section 2523 of the code permits a person who makes a gift to
his spouse to deduct half its value from the measure of the amount
of the gift for tax purposes. In other words, if a husband transfers
$100,000 to his wife by gift, in a common law state he need treat
only $50,000 of it as a taxable gift.
The section also contains a disqualification provision for terminable interests; the marital deduction allowable on a gift is forfeited if the donee's interest is one that may shift from her to another on the occurrence of a condition. Exceptions to the terminable interest disqualification are provided for property transfers
that are substantially the equivalent of a fee interest." And, finally,
gifts of community property are excluded from the benefits of the
deduction.99 All of these qualifying sections bear marked re-semblance to their counterparts under the estate tax marital deduc- ·
tion and, in large part, our discussion concerning the estate tax
provisions is applicable equally as well to the gift tax marital deduction.
B.

Lifetime Splitting Under the Gift Tax Marital Deduction

That this formula for equalizing the two property systems under
the gift tax is unsuccessful should be apparent. There is a tremendous pressure on an estate planner in a common law state to
suggest a program of inter vivos gifts between the spouses in any
~ase in which one spouse owns considerably more property than
the other. If the richer spouse dies first, the esta_te planner can
turn to the estate tax marital deduction and thus split the estate
between the spouses for estate tax purposes. But if the poorer
spouse dies first, the estate planner finds that the bulk of the estate
98 S.

Rep. IOHI, 80th Cong., 2d sess., 1948-1 Cum. Bul. 285 at 351.
§2523 (b), (e), and (f).

99 I.R.C.,
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is in the hands of the surviving spouse who has now forfeited the
opportunity of utilizing the marital deduction unless he remarries.
And so, if he could, the estate planner would like to transfer part
of the richer spouse's estate to the poorer prior to death in order
to split the estate for estate tax purposes regardless of which spouse
dies first.
But the price for making these gifts is a gift tax. The marital
deduction under the gift tax is available only for half the property
given to the poorer spouse; the other half is a taxable transfer. And
weighing in the scales against these proposed lifetime gifts is the
knowledge that the richer spouse can transfer one-half of his net
estate to the poorer spouse completely tax-free on his death. Any
gift tax previously paid on a transfer to the poorer spouse becomes
an unnecessary expenditure if the richer spouse dies first. 100
If lifetime splitting cannot be accomplished between spouses
without incurring a tax liability, there is obviously no equality
between the common law and community property systems under
the federal gift tax.

C.

Gifts to Others

Faced with this situation, the estate planner usually finds his
solution to lie in encouraging gifts by the richer spouse directly
to the secondary beneficiaries, by-passing his spouse. By such a
program, the richer spouse can reduce the discrepancy between
his own and his spouse's estates. The loss of the marital deduction
to him will thus be much less severe if the poorer spouse dies first. ·
And here, unlike the situation under the gift tax marital deduction, the richer spouse may take advantage of the split-gift provisions without forfeiting other advantages he may have under the
estate tax marital deduction. In this situation he is treated just
like his counterpart in a community property state who makes gifts
from the community property.101

III.

CONCLUSION

We believe it is abundantly clear that the marital deduction has
fallen short of its goal of equalization. On the quantitative side,
100 See the discussion in Part I, B, 4 supra. Neither the credit for gift taxes (§2012)
nor the credit for prior transfers (§2013) would be available to the estate of the poorer
spouse on her subsequent death because she is the donee of the gifts. Nor are these
credits available to the richer spouse, unless, in the case of the former, the gifts fall into
the richer spouse's gross estate for estate tax purposes.
101 See the discussion in Part I, B, 5 supra.
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the major disparity grows out of the fact that the marital deduction
is a function of only one spouse's estate, not of the total estate of
both spouses (as in the case of community property splitting).
And from the qualitative viewpoint, we find that even more discrepancies exist, brought about in part by the ingenuity of estate
planners. A technical rule of disqualification, such as the terminable interest rule, is an open invitation for the design of plans that
fall just outside the proscribed limits but within the rule's purpose.
Because the approach may have been unwise does not mean
that the policy underlying the marital deduction is erroneous.
But the marital deduction formula needs much greater revision
than it received in 1954.
As a matter of ultimate social policy, we believe that it is hard
to quarrel with the thesis that a man's estate and his earnings
ought to be available to his spouse after his death without diminution for estate taxes. Perhaps this belief is an outgrowth and
natural product of the community property system itself. A wife
shares and contributes to the building up of her husband's accumulations equally as much in a common law jurisdiction as under
community property rules. And, if this is true, it seems unfair to
reduce the amount of these accumulations to which she has contributed by way of a tax on her husband's death. For these reasons
the policy of the marital deduction has much to commend it.
But can such a policy be implemented by a statutory framework that will achieve equalization? Perhaps. One method
would be to provide a complete exemption from estate and gift
tax for all interspousal transfers. This is a suggestion that has been
made frequently in the past and its adoption appears to be as remote
as ever.102
Another suggestion for improvement would be to adopt a
series of amendments to the present marital deduction formula.
The first of these, we believe, ought to be to get rid of the qualitative restrictions on the types of transfer that qualify for the deduction. In other words, the terminable interest rule, which has
caused so much grief and misunderstanding, should be eliminated,
if for no other reason than the fact that its restrictions can readily
be avoided both in common law and community property jurisdictions.
102Surrey, "Federal Taxation of the Family-The Revenue Act of 1948," 61 HARv. L.
REv. 1097 at 1161 (1948).
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Coupled with this relief must obviously be a provision designed
to catch the property in the surviving spouse's estate if it is deductible in the decedent's estate. Under the existing rule which
exempts a remainder interest from taxation in the life tenant's
estate, the terminable interest rule is essential in order to prevent
wholesale tax avoidance. But if the rule is revised, or if a condition is attached to the deduction that the surviving spouse agree
to report the value of the remainder in her estate, this difficulty
would be eliminated. At any rate, an amendment of the rules
relating to the taxation of life tenants must go hand in hand with
any relaxation of the terminable interest rule.
Turning to the quantitative inequalities that presently exist
under the marital deduction formula, we believe that the best hope
for equality lies in the correlation of the estate and gift taxes into
one over-all transfer tax pattern. In other words, gifts by living
persons should be treated as part of a person's ultimate estate
plan, which in many cases they really are. A tax would be levied
on these gifts as a prepayment of the ultimate estate tax due.
Basically, what we are trying to do is to permit an owner of
common law property to transfer one-half of it to his spouse tax-free,
whether the transfers are during life or at death. The available
marital deduction would be exhausted either by inter vivos gifts
or by bequests at death. To the extent that gifts during life had
been made under the deduction, the amount of the deduction
allowable at death would be correspondingly reduced.
And, finally, to accomplish complete equality, we would find
it necessary to make the deduction a function of the total estate
of both spouses.103 The amount of the deduction would no longer
be one-half of the decedent's adjusted gross estate, but it would be
one-half of the total of the decedent's estate plus his spouse's property. Any property owned by his spouse would reduce the amount
of the deduction dollar for dollar, regardless of the source from
which the property came. As we have pointed out in some detail
earlier,10 4 only a formula based on the total holdings of both
spouses can approach the philosophy behind the community
system.
Whether or not these suggestions are of value and would provide a feasible and workable solution to the dilemma of equaliza103 Cf. Sugarman, "Estate and Gift Tax Equalization-The Marital Deduction,'' 36
CALIF. L. REv. 223 at 280 (1948).
104 See

Part I, A, 2 supra.
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tion will depend upon the thought and criticism that can be
brought to bear upon them. Perhaps the changes brought forward here would only serve to complicate even more an already
complicated problem. But, on the other hand, these suggestions
may ultimately prove to be an acceptable solution to our present
difficulties and complexities. Only further study and criticism
can give the answer.
·

